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Abstract and Keywords: 
 
Circumstances are the attendant properties of human action. Aquinas asserts that the end and object 
are the main factors in determining the moral value of human action, however, he also states that 
circumstances can play a role in evaluating moral actions. The purpose of this paper is to show 
how Aquinas develops a moral theory that allows the circumstances of human action to play a role 
in the specification human actions. Specific circumstances overlap with the end and object of 
human action and individual circumstances can become a main feature of human action. 
Circumstances have the potential to influence moral specification. 
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Human actions may be considered in various ways in order to determine their moral value. 
Examining the action itself does not provide enough information to ascertain if the action is 
morally good or bad. There are other factors to consider when determining the moral value of an 
action such as the agent’s will, the motive behind the action, and the circumstances surrounding 
the action. Many different medieval explanations of moral goodness include these factors, but 
often one factor is more significant than the others in determining moral worth.  
For Thomas Aquinas, the moral worth of human action is predominantly determined by 
the end the action intends rather than the action itself. The object of a human action is the deed 
that is performed. When the object is the determining factor of a moral theory, the moral value of 
human action relies heavily on the deed performed. The end of the agent is the motivation behind 
why the agent acts. When the end is the determining factor for a moral theory, the focus of moral 
value shifts from the deed performed to the agent. Within Aquinas’s moral theory, the agent is 
placed at the center of morality. This shift in the focus of morality from the action to the agent is 
significant within his account because Aquinas considers moral action as human action. Only 
human actions can be moral because humans have the ability to control their own actions through 
will and reason.1 Not all actions performed by a human being are properly human actions. 
Breathing, for instance, is an action performed both by humans and non-human animals, but does 
not require will and reason so that even when it is a human that is breathing, the action is not 
considered ‘human’ or ‘moral’.2 Hereafter, human action and moral action will be used 
interchangeably to refer to actions that humans perform as only they can be evaluated for moral 
goodness.  
Human action must be performed deliberately and freely. These two conditions are key in 
understanding Aquinas’s moral theory. The agent’s will must be free of coercion when it pursues 
an end.3 The end is consciously pursued, regardless of whether every step towards that end is 
carefully considered or if only the final end is in focus.4 The end of human action is directed by 
the will, which can be simply described as rational desire; the agent must be voluntarily pursuing 
                                                 
1 Thomas Aquinas, ST I-II q. 18 a. 6 co. 
2 Examples include unconscious movements and reflexes. Read more: Terence Irwin, "Aquinas: Will." In The 
Development of Ethics: Volume 1, The Development of Ethics: Volume 1, Chapter 16. Oxford University Press, 2007: 
443. 
3 Any action that is not involuntary would be considered as performed voluntarily. One of the few examples considered 
as involuntary is an action that is compelled by force, such as a person holding the agent’s hand and forcing the agent 
to sign a contract. If a tyrant pressures an agent to perform a specific action under threat of violence, the agent still 
has an option to voluntarily perform the action. In that case, the action would be the result of the agent choosing the 
path that avoids violence. Read more: Kevin L. Flannery, "The Field of Moral Action According to Thomas Aquinas." 
The Thomist: A Speculative Quarterly Review 69, no. 1 (2005): 12-15. 
4 There are various stages to willing human action to an end. Some ends require careful consideration, such as 
graduating college, in which classes are carefully considered to ensure receiving a diploma. Some actions do not 
require much deliberation, such as preparing breakfast. Often, the agent’s focus is mainly on the desired goal and not 
every phase of the will is consciously acknowledged in the process of reaching the goal. The process of willing an 
action to an end is complex and a deeper analysis of the phases can be read from: John Finnis, "Object and Intention 
in Moral Judgments According to Aquinas." Thomist : A Speculative Quarterly Review 55, no. 1 (1991): 1-27. 
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an end with knowledge of that end. Despite stating that the end determines the moral quality of 
human action, Aquinas does continue to examine the other features of human action that play a 
role in determining moral value. He places the starting point for moral specification on the end but 
also considers the object of human action and the circumstances around the action. The object is 
judged by the agent’s reason for its objective moral quality. The circumstances, which are also 
judged by reason, are the attendant properties of the action performed, as such they can be 
considered ‘exterior’ to the action. They are the various additional details that can affect the way 
the action performed is perceived, and therefore affect the moral evaluation of human action. 
The purpose of this paper is to show how Aquinas develops a moral theory that allows the 
circumstances of human action to play a role in specifying human action as good or bad. At its 
foundation, Aquinas’s moral theory is based on the interaction between the object and the end. 
However, by considering the circumstances which surround human action, he opens the door for 
human actions to be evaluated based on something apparently exterior to them. A moral theory 
based on just one factor can be a simple and unifying theory. In contrast to this, Aquinas’s moral 
theory is complex and can even look contradictory by including a factor that is by its definition 
variable. 
The first section of this paper will be a brief look at two other accounts of moral theory 
because they will clearly demonstrate how Aquinas’s evaluation of human action is different; the 
second section will be an analysis of circumstances with subsections that will address (a) why they 
should be considered a factor, (b) what their nature is, (c) what Aquinas identifies as circumstances, 
and (d) what their hierarchy is in the evaluation of moral goodness; the third section will explain 
the role of circumstances in (a) affecting the end and the object and (b) affecting moral 
specification; the last section will be a short conclusion. 
Medieval Explanations of Moral Actions 
A consideration of other medieval explanations will be briefly summarized to best 
understand how the end or the object can be the predominant factor for specifying human actions 
and demonstrate how Aquinas’s theory is different. Two of the predominant moral theories before 
Aquinas (1225-1274) belonged to Peter Abelard (1079-1142) and Peter Lombard (1096-1160). 
The determinant factors for the goodness or badness of human actions were mainly the end and 
the object. Each philosopher considered both factors in his theory but came to different conclusions 
for which factor to place at the center of morality. Abelard’s theory has the intention of the agent 
at the center of morality while Lombard’s theory concludes that the object has the most moral 
weight in human actions. Through examining how the end and the object play a role in these two 
opposing moral accounts, it is possible to see how Aquinas’s moral theory evaluates these factors 
in a different way. 
Abelard emphasizes intention as the only factor for evaluating the moral goodness of 
human action. For intention to be good, two criteria must be met: (1) the motivation for the deed 
must “spring from a love of God for his own sake and not merely because of the goods that He 
provides” and (2) the deed performed must be pleasing to God and not hinder God’s plan. 
 5 
Abelard’s consideration of the object is problematic for two reasons. First, although Abelard 
considers the deed performed, the moral goodness of the deed relies on God’s will, which means 
the agent must be able to assess what actions agree with God’s plan.5 Second, by including the 
object in the criteria for good intention, the value of the deed performed does not have an impact 
on the moral value of human action, it only affects the intention. Therefore, regardless of what 
action the agent performs, the moral evaluation of human action depends solely on intention.6 
Abelard places the agent’s intention (the end for human action) over the performed deed (the object 
of human action) so that when the intention is good, human action is morally good.  
For Lombard, on the other hand, intention remains an important factor for evaluating moral 
goodness but the object itself has moral value that is evaluated outside of intention. Good intention 
is necessary for human action to be considered good but it is not sufficient. There are two aspects 
of action: an interior act (the mental act of the intention) and an exterior act (the performed deed).7 
By differentiating between the two acts, Lombard is able to discuss the goodness of the will 
separately from the goodness of the deed performed. Starting with the interior act, the will is good 
if the end it pursued is good; the end is good if it is informed by a love of God. For the exterior 
act, the intrinsic value of the object must also be taken into account when considering the moral 
goodness of human action. The deed itself has an objective value of moral goodness that lies 
outside of the agent’s will. Murder and theft, as examples, are always bad deeds regardless of the 
agent’s intent. A human action, performed with a good will and towards a good end, is still morally 
bad if the deed performed is morally bad itself.8 The will, the end, and the object must all be 
considered in regards to moral value, but the moral goodness of the object is the determining factor. 
For its part, Aquinas’s moral theory is based on the interaction between the object and the 
end so that there is not one determining factor for the moral value of human action. There are two 
components to human action: the interior act and the exterior act. The exterior act is the object of 
human action- the deed performed. The interior act is the object of the will- the end. The end 
toward which human action is performed is good if it is motivated by the good (this will be 
examined further in the following section). The object is judged for its moral character by reason. 
The two acts are able to interact with each other; the goodness or badness of one influencing the 
other. Aquinas argues that human action is directed towards an end, so that the agent’s will directs 
the execution of the exterior act towards the end. Because human action begins from the interior 
act, the goodness of human action depends on the end. However, because the two acts work 
together, the exterior act can affect the moral value of human action. If the exterior act is theft, it 
                                                 
5 God’s plan might be known through Scripture and the commandments. As Hoffman states: “To be truly pleasing to 
God requires a full assessment of the situation at hand. One must foresee how one’s actions may or may not be in line 
with God’s designs.” Tobias Hoffmann, "Moral Action as Human Action: End and Object in Aquinas in Comparison 
with Abelard, Lombard, Albert, and Duns Scotus." The Thomist: A Speculative Quarterly Review 67, no. 1 (2003): 
76.  
6 For example: a mother accidentally smothers her baby while asleep but this action is not properly called a sin. Read 
more: Peter Abelard, Peter Abelard’s Ethics. Translated by D. E. Luscombe. Oxford, England: Clarendon Press; New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1971: 39. 
7 Hoffman, “Moral Action,” 78. 
8 Peter Lombard, II Sent., d. 40 cap. un., n. 12. 
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affects the interior act and makes the human action morally bad. If the exterior act is good, but the 
motivations for the end is bad, then the human action would also be morally bad. To have a morally 
good action, the object and the end must both be good.  
In contrast to the other authors discussed, Aquinas’s theory does not rely on one factor to 
determine whether a human action is morally good or bad. While Abelard considers the object of 
human action, the deed performed is not good or bad on its own moral character but is informed 
by the intention behind the deed.9 He allows intention too much authority to sway the moral 
character of human action. Lombard’s theory does consider the end of human action, but the end 
was outweighed by the moral quality of the object, which became the defining characteristic of its 
moral theory. Aquinas’s moral theory considers the interrelationship between the end and the 
object to evaluate the moral goodness of human action. He shares with both prior philosophers the 
attention to the end. Following Abelard, importance is given to the agent’s motive for performing 
certain human actions. But a motive is not good enough; there must be an evaluation of the object 
of human action. Similar to Lombard, he realizes the deed performed must have its own moral 
character that affects the whole human action. Therefore, Aquinas develops a moral theory that 
demonstrates a complex dynamic between the end and the object of human action. However, there 
are other factors that affect the moral goodness of human action and they must be considered.  
Circumstances 
The moral value of human action is affected by more than just one factor as has been 
established within Aquinas’s own moral explanation. The end and the object are among the factors 
that affect moral actions. Each of which has been examined as the determining factor for moral 
goodness in different explanations for their role in human action. For Aquinas, there are a total of 
four elements that contribute to the moral goodness of human action: (1) its existence as a 
completed action, (2) its object having been informed by reason, (3) its circumstances and (4) its 
end.10 The previous section gave a brief summary of the roles of the object and the end in 
specification. In this section, the action’s existence as such will be addressed and the role of 
circumstances, which are the details that accompany human action, will follow. Aquinas states 
very clearly in his Summa Theologiae that in order to specify human actions, the circumstances 
must be considered: 
 
To be fully good [human action] must have not only what defines it, but something 
is added from these which come to it as certain accident: and such are its due 
circumstances. (Nam plenitudo bonitatis eius non tota consistit in sua specie, sed 
aliquid additur ex his quae adveniunt tanquam accidentia quaedam. Et huiusmodi 
sunt circumstantiae debitae).11 
                                                 
9 On objective conditions for Abelard’s ethics, read more: John Marenbon, "The Rediscovery of Peter Abelard's 
Philosophy." The Journal of the History of Philosophy 44, no. 3 (2006): 331-351. 
10 ST I-II q. 18 a. 4 co. 
11 ST I-II q. 18 a. 3 co. trans. McDermott, with changes. 
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As with any substance, there are properties that are not essential but that complete the substance 
in some way.12 Just as substances have accidents (people, for instance, have color as an attendant 
property), human actions have circumstances. Simply stated, circumstances are what stand around 
an action. The Latin term, circumstantia, comes from circum (around) and sto (stand), so that in 
Latin ‘circumstances’ literally means ‘things that stand around.’ Aquinas mentions that the term 
circumstantia derives from descriptions of spatial relations, where something is located outside of 
another, but still touches it and is near it.13 By relating this example, Aquinas illustrates the 
connection between human action and circumstances. Human actions do not exist as just a deed 
performed toward some end; they are touched by the details which can affect how the action is 
viewed.  
 
a. Why are circumstances a factor? 
Aquinas has stated that the moral goodness of human action is specified especially by the 
end because human action is performed to achieve some end.14 Actions are properly called human 
actions when they arise from the distinctive power that belongs to humans, which is the ability to 
direct their own actions through reason and will.15 Humans direct their actions towards an end 
because they are able to (1) rationally recognize a goal, (2) deliberate the means to reach that goal, 
and (3) put into motion the necessary steps towards the goal. Once the goal has been reached, the 
agent is able to achieve (4) enjoyment, the final phase of human action.16 The agent moves from 
one step to another through use of reason, while the agent’s will directs the execution of actions 
towards the end. The end is something that must be rationally recognized as good. Reason gives 
humans the capacity to grasp what is good qua good, or a universal good, and the will directs the 
end toward this universal good. Aquinas argues that each individual human action is performed 
towards some end, but the ultimate end of all human action is the universal good.  
The moral value of human action in a universal sense would be determined by the ultimate 
end as Aquinas has put forward. It is determining the moral goodness of each individual action 
that is more complicated. The end of an individual human action is not a universal good but a 
particular thing recognized as good. This end is what gives each action its moral specification. 
Reason enables the agent to make a connection between a universal good and a particular good 
and relate the particular good to the end of individual human actions. When human action is no 
longer an abstract idea moving toward the ultimate end, it becomes a tangible action that is 
weighed down with additional details directed toward a particular end. The particular end of 
                                                 
12 Aquinas’s understanding of substantial forms is influenced by Aristotle. Read more: Brian Davies and James 
Doig, "Aquinas and Aristotle." In The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas, The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas, Chapter 3. 
Oxford University Press, 2012. 
13 ST I-II q. 7 a. 1 co. 
14 ST I-II q. 7 a. 4 ad 2. 
15 Compared to actions performed by humans that are not properly called human actions as mentioned in the 
Introduction. See footnote 2. 
16 Finnis, "Object and Intention,” 4. 
 8 
individual human actions can be the determining factor of the action but the details surrounding 
the action must be considered because the action no longer exists without a specific agent outside 
of time and space. Particular human actions cannot exist without these details and there must be 
an agent who actualizes the interior act to an exterior act. These details are the circumstances that 
accompany human action.  
The circumstances must be considered because the specification of human action can 
change as the circumstances change. Circumstances give a fuller depiction of human action and 
each particular human action is surrounded by individual details that can be relevant to the 
goodness of human actions. Each circumstance can contribute to the moral goodness or badness 
of a human action and has the ability to influence its moral specification. 
 
b. What is the nature of circumstances? 
Thus far circumstances have been described as the details surrounding human action, but 
more accurately they should be called accidents of human action. Aquinas clearly establishes how 
circumstances are attached to human action in the Summa Theologiae: 
 
Whatever conditions are outside the substance of an action, and yet in some way 
touch human action, are called circumstances. Now what is outside the substance 
of a thing, while it belongs to that thing, is called its accident. Wherefore the 
circumstances of human actions should be called their accidents. (Quaecumque 
conditiones sunt extra substantiam actus, et tamen attingunt aliquo modo actum 
humanum, circumstantiae dicuntur. Quod autem est extra substantiam rei ad rem 
ipsam pertinens, accidens eius dicitur. Unde circumstantiae actuum humanorum 
accidentia eorum dicenda sunt.)17 
 
Circumstances stand around human action as accidents or attendant properties belonging to that 
action. Although it is not an essential property of the action, it carries weight when the whole 
action, starting from the will all the way to the execution of the action, is analyzed for moral value. 
To understand how circumstances have any impact on the moral relevance of a human action, the 
notion of accidents and how Aquinas understands it in conjunction with human actions must be 
addressed. 
Aquinas understands human action analogically as a substance. In his description of 
circumstances, they are the conditions outside the “substance of an action (substantiam actus).” 
Actions are not really substances, but considered as such insofar as it helps Aquinas’s explanation. 
The goodness of human action is judged in the same way that substances exist. For an action to be 
good, it must exist fully. A human being is said to “fully exist in the complex of soul and body 
endowed with every ability and organ needed for knowledge and movement” and if a person were 
to lack any of this he would not exist fully.18 Existing for substance as such would be good, and 
                                                 
17 ST I-II q. 7 a. 1 co. trans. Fathers, with changes. 
18 ST I-II q. 18 a. 1 co. 
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not existing fully would lack this goodness and therefore be bad. In the same way, actions are 
called ‘good’ when they exist fully and when they exist less fully, they are ‘bad’. For a substance 
to exist fully it requires a form and matter to define it, so too would an action. The analogous form 
of human action is the end, while the analogous material is the object. 
 
And the species of human action then is defined formally by their end, and 
materially by the object of the external action (Et ideo actus humani species 
formaliter consideratur secundum finem, materialiter autem secundum objectum 
exterioris actus).19 
 
Human actions can be understood as a substance because of the interaction between the 
interior and exterior acts. The end is the proper object of the interior act, as such the goodness of 
the interior act is dependent on the goodness of the end. Just as a substance receives its species 
from its form, an action receives its species from the end of the action. The end controls and gives 
form to the action and in that way, it corresponds to the form of a substance. The object corresponds 
to matter from the interaction of the interior and exterior acts. Aquinas describes the object as the 
“material about which (materia circa quam)” and therefore the object can give species.20 This 
materia circa quam explains that the object is not simply the material, but one that is especially 
concerned with human action, and has input towards specification.21 The object of an action has 
the ability to make the action good or bad relative to reason, which is how it can influence 
specification of human action. The interior act of the will gives form to the external activity, whose 
proper object is the object (or performed deed) of human action. The interior act of the will can 
actualize the potentiality of the exterior act to be the object of human action.  
By describing human action analogously as a substance, Aquinas demonstrates how 
circumstances can be called accidents of human action. The circumstances stand around human 
action as non-defining properties of the action just as accidents attend substances as non-defining 
properties. These properties add details to substances that they do not have by definition. 
Circumstances are accidents of human actions in that they do not specify the actions in the same 
manner as the end (form) and object (matter), but not all non-defining properties of a substance 
are incidental. It is in this non-defining but also non-incidental way that circumstances influence 
specification, along with the end and object. When the circumstance loses its incidental aspect, it 
becomes a key factor in human action. This analogy of human action as a substance emphasizes 
the attachment of circumstances as accidents to human action. 
Another important aspect that is highlighted by this analogy is how human actions can be 
described as morally good or bad. Substances receive specification from their forms because the 
form is what defines the essence of a substance. Without this analogy, human action would not 
                                                 
19 ST I-II q. 18 a. 6 co. trans. McDermott, with changes. 
20 ST I-II q. 18 a. 2 ad. 2. 
21 There are three types of matter according to Aquinas: “substantial potency (materia ex qua), accidental potency 
(materia in qua), and that towards which an action or virtue is oriented (materia circa quam).” Read more: Joseph 
Pilsner, The Specification of Human Actions in St Thomas Aquinas. Oxford Theological Monographs. 2006: 147. 
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warrant moral specification because accidents do not exist outside of their subjects. Accidents do 
not receive specification because they neither have a form nor independent existence. Human 
actions considered analogously as substances can be specified. Aquinas uses on this analogy to 
ensure that human actions are viewed as candidates for moral specification.  
Accidents are the attendant properties of a substance. Substances exist in themselves, 
meaning that their essence does not exist as a part of anything else. Some examples of substances 
include cats, trees, and notably, humans. A substance is composed of form and matter, so that 
anything outside of these two are accidents.22 The substantial form is what makes the subject qua 
subject. Substances have essential properties, which define what the substance is permanently, and 
accidental properties, which modify the substance. Accidents are incidental to the substance, so 
that with or without a particular accident, the essence of the subject does not change. They exist 
as a part of a substance but do not exist in themselves. Examples of accidents include green, soft, 
and round. An accident of a tree is the color green. Green exists in the tree and other objects but 
the color green cannot be found by itself. Because it always exists as a part of a substance and not 
of itself, it is an accident.  
While substances can have more than one accident, substances themselves cannot exist in 
some other substance. Humans are substances in and of themselves, so the question of how 
Aquinas can describe circumstances as accidents of human action arises. Human actions are 
accidents of humans and cannot be the substances for circumstances, which are themselves 
accidents. Aquinas does recognize that both human actions and circumstances are accidents of 
humans. Humans as substances can have more than one accident and these accidents can be 
accidents of each other, so that circumstances are accidents of human action.  
Aquinas puts forward two explanations for how two accidents of one subject can be related 
to each other. First, properties can be accidents of each other by being in the same subject. The 
example Aquinas provides is that whiteness and the ability to play music both exist in Socrates. 
Both are accidents of Socrates, but are also accidents of each other since they exist in the same 
subject. For instance, a subject can have the ability to run and be brown-eyed. Ability to run and 
being brown-eyed are accidents of each other by existing in the same subject. Second, the attendant 
properties can relate directly to one another. Here, the example given by Aquinas is that of a body 
that receives color from its surface. They are accidents of each other because one exists within the 
other. A subject can be running quickly. Running and the quickness of running are accidents of 
each other, even though the subject is quick by means of running, and quickness exists in the 
subject because of the running. It is in these two ways that circumstances exist as accidents of 
human action. Having clarified how human action and circumstances are related to each other 
accidents, the next topic is what exactly the circumstances are considered in themselves and not 
through an analogy. 
 
                                                 
22 This broad account is intended simply to clarify the role of circumstances as accidents in the analogy. For a summary 
of form and matter, see: Thomas Ainsworth, "Form vs. Matter", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 
2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.) https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2020/entries/form-matter/. 
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c. What does Aquinas identify as circumstances? 
Aquinas begins with well-known sources, Aristotle and Cicero, for what he identifies as 
the circumstances around human action. Aristotle states in the Nicomachean Ethics that 
circumstances are important in judging actions and enumerates the items that should be consider 
circumstances of human action: the agent (quis), the action (quid), the object of the action (circa 
quid), in what the agent works (in quo operatur), the instrument the agent uses (quo instrumento), 
the end of the action (gratia cuius), and the manner of the agent (qualiter).23 In the De inventitione, 
Cicero identifies circumstances as “quis (who), quid (what), ubi (where), quibus auxiliis (by what 
aids), cur (why), quomodo (how), quando (when)”.24 On both lists are who, what, by what 
instrument, why, and how. Aristotle has circa quid and in quo, while Cicero includes ubi and 
quando. Aristotle’s in quo can encompass Cicero’s ubi and quando. The list of circumstances for 
Aquinas is:  
 
o Quis- the agent performing the action 
o Quid- the deed performed 
o Cur- the motivation for performing the action 
o Circa quid- the object or people affected by the action 
o Quomodo- the manner in which the action is carried out 
o Quibus auxiliis- the instruments or people (besides the agent) who assists 
o Ubi- the location of the action 
o Quando- the moment of the action 
 
Aquinas includes all the items on Cicero’s list and adds the circa quid from Aristotle’s list. To best 
understand each circumstance in a human action, an example will be examined: 
 
On a Friday afternoon, a man quickly robs a charity by holding a gun at a volunteer 
staff so that he might increase his own wealth. 
 
The quis is the man. The quid is the robbery. The ubi is the charity. The quibus auxiliis is the gun. 
The cur is to increase his own wealth. The quomodo is quickly. The quando is a Friday afternoon. 
And the circa quid is the volunteer staff.  
                                                 
23 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1111a2-6; Thomas Aquinas, Opera Omnia (Paris: Vivès, 1871–80), xxv. In 
Aristotelis Stagiritae Nonnullos Libros Commentaria; In X Libros ad Ethicorum (1875), p. 327, col. 1. Forsitan igitur 
non malum determinare haec, quae et quot sint: et quis utique et quid et circa quid vel in quo operatur, quandoque 
autem et quo, puta instrumento, et gratia cuius, puta salutis, et qualiter, puta quiete vel vehementer. “A man may be 
ignorant, then, of who he is, what he is doing, what or whom he is acting on, and sometimes also what (e.g. what 
instrument) he is doing it with, and to what end (e.g. he may think his act will conduce to some one's safety), and how 
he is doing it (e.g. whether gently or violently).” Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics. Translated by J. A. K. Thomson. 
Penguin Classics, 2004. 
24 For the circumstances from Cicero, see ST I-II q. 7 a. 3 co. See footnote 43 in Flannery, "The Field of Moral Action,” 
17. 
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In Aquinas’s view, there are three ways in which the circumstances are a property of human 
action: they belong to the deed performed, to the cause of the deed, or to the effect of the deed. 
The quando, ubi, and quomodo belong to the deed itself; cur, circa quid, quis, and quibus auxiliis 
belong to the cause; and quid belongs to the effect. His organization demonstrates how the 
circumstances touch every aspect of a human action. They also touch on the essential properties 
of human action and the factors that determine moral specification. The circumstance of quomodo 
shows how the agent is carrying out the action, illustrating voluntary action. The circumstance of 
cur addresses the agent’s motivation and the will’s intent towards an end, therefore demonstrating 
deliberate action. The circumstance of quid touches the object of human action. The circumstances 
are relevant because they address the factors that are important for Aquinas’s moral theory.  
The circumstances of cur and quid overlap with the end and object of human action. The 
object is encompassed by the quid while the end is incorporated into the cur. Although they are 
the accidents of human action, and by definition are non-defining properties, they are properties 
that are characteristic of moral action.25 Human action is specified by its essential properties, that 
it is voluntary and deliberate. As both circumstances of cur and quid are directed by will and 
reason, they make a difference morally and have weight in the moral evaluation of human actions. 
The end is intended by the will so that the circumstance of cur is no longer incidental to the interior 
act of human action.26 For the exterior act, the object is informed by reason and its execution in 
the body is directed by the will, so that the circumstance of quid loses its incidental quality. A 
circumstance that is incidental for one human action, may be essential for another action, and so it 
becomes morally relevant. When the circumstance is treated as the difference in a human action, 
it can decide the moral kind of the action. The circumstances of quid and cur are no longer 
incidental, or circumstantial, but become the main factors in determining the moral goodness of a 
human action.27  
 
d. What is the hierarchy of circumstances? 
Each circumstance touches some aspect of human action, but some more than others 
because they can become the determining factor of moral worth in that action. The circumstances 
can be arranged in a hierarchy of how much they affect the moral worth of human action. The most 
important circumstances are the cur and the quid of human action. The remaining circumstances 
are arranged in importance according to how much they affect human action, although the 
importance of each individual circumstance can move up or down in the hierarchy when every 
detail of human action has been considered. 
 
1. Cur: The motivation behind the agent’s action. It is the most important circumstance because 
it touches the end of human action. The end is the cause of the action since it moves the agent 
to perform the deed and it is the predominant factor for moral specification. Human action is 
                                                 
25 ST I-II q. 18 a. 3 ad. 2. 
26 ST I-II q. 18 a 6 ad 2. 
27 ST I-II q. 18 a 10 co. 
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driven by the cur circumstance so that for every human action, there is always an attending 
circumstance that answers the question of why.  
2. Quid: The deed that was performed. It is second in importance because it touches the object of 
human action. The quid is a necessary circumstance of every human action. A deed must be 
performed for moral specification to be assigned.28 If there were no actual deed, the exterior 
act of human action has not been executed and therefore there is no action to label as morally 
good or bad. 
3. Quis: The agent who performs the deed. He is important in regard to carrying out a deed as the 
efficient cause of the action. There must be an agent for every moral action. The quis 
circumstance touches a number of the other circumstances, for example: the cur touches it by 
moving the agent to act; the quibus auxiliis describes the tool that the agent uses to carry out 
the action. 
4. Quomodo: The manner and quality of the agent’s action. It is not an especially important 
circumstance in the hierarchy nor a necessary circumstance in evaluating the moral quality of 
human action. The circumstance of quomodo is an especially good example of Aquinas’s 
explanation on how accidents can relate to one another. It is an accident of the agent by means 
of existing in the action (which is also an accident of the agent) and it is also an accident of the 
action, which makes it a circumstance of human action. 
5. Circa quid: The people or objects that are affected by the action. Like quomodo, it is not 
especially important in the hierarchy nor necessary in evaluating the moral action. This 
particular circumstance explains the material cause of the action.29 
6. Quibus auxiliis: The instrument that the agent uses to carry out the action. Similar to the 
previous two circumstances, it is not especially important in the hierarchy nor necessary in 
evaluating the moral action. Similar to the quomodo circumstance, it touches the action as an 
accident of the agent. This circumstance explains the instrumental cause of the action.  
7. Quando: The time of the action. The moment of an action is not especially important in the 
hierarchy nor necessary in evaluating the moral action. However, quando belongs to the action 
in that human action cannot exist without occurring at a moment in time.  
8. Ubi: The location of the action. The place of an action is not especially important in the 
hierarchy nor necessary in evaluating the moral human action. However, ubi belongs to the 
action in that human action cannot exist without occurring in a location.  
 
In organizing the circumstances in order of importance, it is possible to see how each one 
actually touches the action and can potentially affect moral evaluation. Cur and quid are necessary 
circumstances as they overlap the end and the object of human action. Quis, quando, and ubi are 
necessary circumstances of human action because human action must be carried out by an agent, 
                                                 
28 Flannery clarifies why the quid is an important circumstance of moral action: “Moral blame comes back to acts or 
it makes no sense at all. If someone blames another simply for being possessed of a certain vice, the accused can 
reasonably say, “but what have I done?” or “how do you know I possess that vice?” See more: Flannery, “The Field 
of Moral Action,” 24. 
29 For more on circa quid, see footnote 16 in Pilsner, “The Specification of Human Actions,” 179. 
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at some time and in some place. However, they do not necessarily affect the moral quality of the 
action. Quomodo, circa quid, and quibus auxiliis are not necessary circumstances of human action 
and do not necessarily affect the moral quality of the action. The hierarchy provides an outline of 
how each circumstance can potentially be a factor in moral evaluation. The importance of each 
circumstance can change depending on individual human actions.  
Returning to the example in the previous section, it is possible to examine how changes in 
circumstances can potentially affect moral specification. 
 
On a Friday afternoon, a man quickly robs a charity by holding a gun at a volunteer 
staff so that he might increase his own wealth. 
The circumstance that especially determines the moral worth in this example is the cur (which 
overlaps with the end). The interaction between the cur and the quid (which overlaps with the 
object) together specifies this action to be labelled morally bad. The other circumstances, such as 
the quando and quomodo, do not affect the moral specification. The robbery could have happened 
slowly (quomodo) or on a Monday morning (quando) and the species of the human action would 
remain the same. A modification of the example would demonstrate how the importance of 
individual circumstances can increase.  
 
On a Friday afternoon, a man quickly robs a church by holding a gun at a volunteer 
staff so that he might increase his own wealth. 
 
The cur (end) and the quid (object) and all the other circumstances, except the ubi, remain the 
same. The ubi is now a church. The deed of robbing for the purpose of increasing his own wealth 
is still considered morally bad but the ubi has become another important contributing 
circumstance. By stealing from a church, the man is not simply committing a robbery, he is 
committing contempt of God, which is a far worse deed. This example demonstrates how one 
circumstance can move up in the hierarchy to become a contributing factor in evaluating moral 
goodness. Another modification of the example demonstrates how the hierarchy of circumstances 
can change completely.  
 
On a Friday afternoon, a man quickly robs a charity by holding a gun at a volunteer 
staff so that he might buy food to feed his kids. 
 
The quid (object) and all the other circumstances, except the cur (end), remain the same. The cur 
is now to feed his kids. The deed of robbing is still bad but the purpose of feeding his kids is good. 
Because human action takes into account the interaction between object and end, the whole human 
action is bad because of the quid. This example demonstrates how the circumstance of quid can 
take precedence over cur in evaluating moral goodness. Each circumstance has the possibility of 
influencing moral specification, but the hierarchy is useful in reaching a standard for evaluating 
the circumstances of moral action. 
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Aquinas again emphasizes how the end and object of an action is especially significant 
regarding the moral value of human action. The end is the starting point for evaluating moral action 
and if the object is also good, the whole human action would be good. By placing so much weight 
on the end of the action, Aquinas emphasizes the agent’s will in specifying moral value. The 
agent’s will is important because it emphasizes the two properties of human action that are 
essential for moral action to be considered human: voluntary and deliberate actions. The deed 
performed is not the primary focus of moral relevance. A possible drawback to blurring the 
importance of the deed performed in favor of the end is that the deed does not hold any moral 
weight. Aquinas is able to counter this objection by saying that the deed performed does have its 
own moral character outside of the realm of human action. Its moral character is judged by reason. 
Another drawback to favoring the end as the primary focus is that the whole weight of the action 
is placed on the will. If the intention of an action were good, but the deed was bad, the bad deed 
would not be accounted for in this action. However, the deed is an essential part of human action 
as a whole and must be considered in combination with the end and the circumstances. With a 
change in the focus of moral relevance, the field in which human action is relevant widens and 
allows for circumstances to play a larger role in the specification of human action. 
Role of circumstances 
 Human action, according to Aquinas, can only be fully good if both the object and the end 
are good. The specification of the moral action is dependent on these two communicating their 
goodness to each other. However, Aquinas also states that human actions are good or bad 
according to the circumstances (actiones humanae secundum circumstantias sunt bonae vel 
malae).30 The circumstances include the cur and quid which correlate to the end and object, 
respectively. Yet these two circumstances are not the only ones that play a significant role in 
influencing moral specification. In the previous section, circumstances were discussed in terms of 
how they are attached to human action, what they are, and the order in which they can potentially 
affect moral specification. This section will look at the various ways in which the circumstances, 
besides the cur and quid, affect specification. 
 
a. Do circumstances affect the end and the object? 
There are overlaps among the circumstances of cur and quid and the end and object of 
human action. The overlap explains how the cur and quid are the main features of the action and 
determine the moral worth of moral human actions. For Aquinas, human action is made up of the 
interior and exterior act and the goodness of the action as a whole is dependent on both being good. 
The end is the object of the interior act and the object of the exterior act is the deed itself (or the 
object). Unlike the end (cur) and object (quid), the other circumstances cannot be morally good or 
bad themselves. The other circumstances are set apart from the object and end, even if they play a 
                                                 
30 ST I-II q. 18 a. 3 s. c. 
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role in influencing moral value. An interesting question arises whether the surrounding 
circumstances have any effect on the goodness of the end and the object. 
As the end is the object of the will, its goodness is dependent on the will. The will is rational 
desire and pursues what reason has perceived to be good.31 For the will to be bad it would have to 
refuse to follow reason, whether it is right or wrong. Mistaken reason presents itself as true so that 
willing it would seem good. Therefore, the will is good if it follows good reason, and is still good 
if it follows mistaken reason. So willing good or bad does not depend on circumstances. If the will 
is good, circumstances cannot change the will. However, ignorance of the circumstances can 
excuse a bad will, this means that not knowing some particular detail of the object can excuse the 
agent from not willing an end, whether it follows right reason or not. Ignorance of the 
circumstances affect knowledge of the object, which is what reason judges for its moral character. 
By not knowing the circumstances of the object, the will is not bad for pursuing that end. An 
example of such a situation:  
 
A woman has sex with a man she thinks is her husband. She later finds out it was 
his twin brother. 
 
Because she did not know that she was having sex with the wrong man at the time, her action is 
not morally bad. Reason presented the man as her husband and her will followed that reason, even 
though it was mistaken. Ignorance of the circa quid (the twin brother) led to mistaken reason, and 
the will followed it. At the time of her action, the end and the object were good, leading to a 
morally good human action. The will, and therefore the end, are directed by reason, but 
circumstances only influence how the object is perceived by reason. 
To consider how the object can be influenced by the circumstances, the basis for its 
objective moral character must be considered. The goodness of an object is derived from reason. 
When an object is judged outside of human action, it is not directed by the will. The deed itself 
can be good, bad, or neutral. For a deed to be good, it agrees with reason. To be bad, the deed 
offends reason. A neutral deed is not informed by reason. All these objects have circumstances 
outside of the cur that can affect their kind. These deeds necessarily involve a quis, quando and 
ubi. The goodness of donating food can be increased when it is learned that the quibus auxiliis is 
the agent’s last can of soup. The badness of stealing can be increased if the stolen goods were 
taken from a church. The circumstances of objects that already have an intrinsic moral character 
can increase or decrease that quality.  
For neutral deeds, the circumstances do not affect the object in the same manner. Walking 
happens during the day, on a sidewalk, and with tennis shoes; these circumstances do not alter the 
moral neutrality of the action. The only circumstance that can affect the moral kind of a neutral 
deed is the cur. Neutral deeds must be combined with an interior act for human action to be 
specified morally good or bad. Neutral deeds are not the same as deeds carried out by humans, 
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such as sleeping. Sleeping has circumstances such as at night, in a bed with a blanket, but does not 
involve will or reason. Such a deed is not properly called a human action.32 
Circumstances do not affect the end towards which human action is directed. Objects can be 
affected by the circumstances in that the degree of kind is increased or decreased. However, the 
object is not qualified by the circumstances in the same manner as a moral action that involves the 
will. The object is judged by reason and depends on reason for its moral kind. Deeds can be neutral 
insofar as the will or the circumstance of cur is not involved. Particular human actions cannot be 
morally neutral. The object of any human action can be directed to good or bad by some end.33 
The goodness of human action is composed of both the interior and exterior act, each of which has 
its own moral character. Changes in either the object or the end do not necessarily affect the other, 
but necessarily affects human action as a whole. 
 
b. Do circumstances affect moral specification? 
There are three main ways in which circumstances can play a role in specifying moral actions: 
circumstances can (1) determine the species of human action, (2) increase or decrease the degree 
of specification, and (3) have no moral relevance. 
  In the first case, the circumstance determines the specification of the action. For Aquinas, 
this circumstance is typically the cur or the quid, but other circumstances can also determine the 
species, such as the circa quid. Changes in the circa quid can affect how an action is perceived. A 
married man having sex with his wife is different from a married man having sex with a woman 
who is not his wife; the first man’s action would be considered morally good while the second 
man’s action would be morally bad. The circumstance of circa quid becomes the determining 
factor of the action being labelled good or bad. Another notable example is that of the virtuous 
pagan, which is a concept in the Middle Ages that addressed the problem of pagans who were not 
saved during their lifetime but lived virtuously. The circumstance of quando would be most 
important here. If the pagan lived before Christ’s resurrection, they did not have a chance to be 
saved and should not be damned because of this. If the pagan lived after Christ’s resurrection, he 
had the opportunity to be saved but did not receive salvation. The quando plays a large part in the 
justification for the damnation of the pagan. Individual circumstances have the ability to determine 
the moral relevance of a human action. 
In the second case, the specification of the action has already been determined but the 
circumstances can further the degree of goodness or badness. If the circumstance of quomodo 
(quickly) in the example of a man quickly robbing a charity with a gun were modified so that he 
robbed the charity repeatedly, the specification of the act would still be morally bad, but the degree 
of badness has increased. If the circumstance of quibus auxiliis (by holding a gun) were not 
included in the description of the robbery, the action would still be morally bad but the degree of 
badness would decrease. Circumstances can affect the goodness or badness but do not necessarily 
                                                 
32 Properly human actions compared to actions carried out by humans, as mentioned in the introduction. See 
footnote 2. 
33 ST I-II q. 18 a. 9 ad 1. 
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alter the species when it has already been determined. This is important because it goes back to 
the notion of how accidents are not essential properties of the substance. Accidents do not affect 
the specification in the same manner as changes in the form (end) or matter (object) would affect 
specification. 
In the last case, human action is not affected by the circumstance. In the example with the 
man robbing a charity, the quis does not necessarily affect the moral goodness of the robbery. The 
quis could be a woman and the robbery would still be carried out for the same purpose with the 
same surrounding details. In this situation, the circumstance of quis is simply an attendant property 
and remains incidental to the action without affecting specification. Not all circumstances are 
relevant in defining the moral quality of an action.  
Although circumstances stand around human action, they touch every aspect of human 
action and can contribute to moral evaluation in different ways. The circumstances besides cur 
(end) and quid (object) can determine the moral specification of human action and when they do, 
they become a differentiating characteristic of the action. Individual circumstances are also able 
to determine the degree of specification without altering the species of the action. When a 
circumstance does not affect the specification or degree of specification, it remains circumstantial. 
It is important to note that Aquinas has mentioned that it is the right circumstances (circumstantiae 
debitae) that are required for human action to be good.34 Not every circumstance must play a role 
in specifying human action, but every circumstance must be considered for its potential to affect 
the moral value of the action. 
Conclusion 
Medieval explanations for evaluating the goodness of human actions have the end and 
object as factors for specification. Aquinas’s theory has the end, object, and circumstances as 
factors for evaluating moral action. He clearly states that the leading factor for moral specification 
is the end and the object is second to that. However, he also says that circumstances can decide 
what kind of good or bad action a moral action is (circumstantia constituit actum moralem in 
aliqua specie boni vel mali).35 He resolves this apparent contradiction by having the end and the 
object overlap with the circumstances of cur and quid. This overlap also demonstrates that, 
although they are details that appear exterior to the action, the circumstances can potentially 
become the main factor for that action. 
Circumstances enhance the description of human action and every action has these 
attendant properties. Human action is not complete without the right circumstances 
(circumstantiae debitae) which are the factors that matter when determining the moral worth. The 
right circumstances often are the cur and quid, but can include the other circumstances depending 
on that particular action. They are important factors for moral action because they have the 
potential to specify moral goodness or badness and to increase or decrease the degree of that 
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specification. Aquinas outlines a hierarchy of how the circumstances can potentially affect the 
goodness of the action.  
This hierarchy places the end (or cur) as the leading factor for specification and second in 
determining goodness is the object (or quid). This is an important aspect of Aquinas’s theory 
because he is placing the agent at the center of morality. By ensuring that the object is second to 
the end, moral action is not simply a list of deeds that are allowed and prohibited, it becomes a 
topic of why some actions are pursued and others are not. This change in perspective addresses 
the reasons why certain ends are pursued and goes to the core of what makes an agent human. The 
particular end of individual actions leads up to the ultimate end, or the universal good. For humans, 
the ultimate end and universal good is the perfection of humans themselves. By putting more 
significance on the end and not the object, the perfection of humans themselves is the motivation 
for every moral action. 
A moral theory that includes circumstances is far more complex than a theory that depends 
solely on one factor. The way that Aquinas has organized circumstances in regard to human action 
demonstrates how wide he makes the field for moral action. Morality does not rely on an object of 
human action, or the end toward which human action is directed, it relies on the interaction of these 
two factors and their overlap with the circumstances, which are themselves multiple and variable. 
A wider approach to evaluating moral actions is preferred because human actions are themselves 
nuanced and complex, not a mere list of actions and their consequences. By developing a theory 
that includes a hierarchy of how circumstances can affect moral actions, Aquinas takes into 
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